Inference and its classification (अनुमानं तस्य प्रकाराश्च) - Revision history

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Knowledge

Types of anubhava

Yathārtha ayathārtha

Prama

Pramana

Four Pramana

== Introduction ==
Nyayashastra explores the practical methods for achieving authentic knowledge of metaphysical truths and the principles of knowing. It is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects where tarkashastra defines Knowledge as of two types: Smriti (Remembrance) and Anubhava (Experience).

What is Smriti and anubhav

Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathārtha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.

There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyakṣa, anumana, upamana and shabda.

Understanding the four pramanas

Pratyksha pramana- In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.

Anumana pramana-

Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.

Upamana pramana - The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ). For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.

Shabda pramana- Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. (āptavākyam śabdaḥ)

Anumana and its three components:

All systems of Indian Philosophy agree in holding that anumana is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of Vyapti or a universal relation between two things.

Classical example of anumana:

There is fire on the mountain because there is smoke; where there is smoke, there is fire.

There are five components of inference: paksha (minor term), sadhya (major term), and hetu (middle term). The hetu makes a link between sadhya and paksha. Here ,Paksha is the subject where we establish something. Paksha is the component of the inference in relation to which the inference is made. For example, the mountain in the above example is the paksha because there has been anumana regarding the mountain. Paksha is to be perceived but not inferred. Sadhya is the object of inference; it is not perceived. Whatever is proved in relation to the paksha is called the sadhya. Fire is sadhya because the existence of fire in the mountain has been proved. By which it is said to be the sadhya in the paksha, it is called the hetu. In the above example, smoke is hetu because, seeing the smoke, it is inferred that there is a fire on the mountain.

Vyapti- Every inference is logically dependent on the knowledge of vyapti. It implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyapya) and the other is pervades (vyapaka). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrary, a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other.

Udaharana

Drishtant is a well-known instructive example that uses analogies to clarify an idea. It is frequently employed outside of formal inference, such as in disputes, scripture, or instruction. Its objective is to clarify an idea or help the audience understand something abstract by using something concrete or familiar.

Difference between anumana and pratyaksha

Perception is limited to the present because perception is done through the sense. the knowledge of the thing which is beyond the reach of the senses is not obtained from perception. But

Types of inference:-

An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyāyikās give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svārtha and parārtha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyaptı or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Pūrvavat and śeṣava inferences are based on causal uniformity, while sāmānyatodrsta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalānvayı, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyāpti or the universal proposition involved in reference.

An inference is called svārtha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who eploys that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. This is illustrated in the case of a man who infers the existence of fire in a hill because he first perceives a mass of smoke in it and then remembers that there is a universal relation between smoke and fire. On the other hand, an inference is parārtha when it aims at demonstrating the truth of the conclusion to other people. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to

it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also present in the minor term

. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parārtha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.

In the Nyaya-Sūtra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, pūrvavat, sesavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a pūrvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sādhya or the major term as its cause and is, there- fore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A śeṣavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current It will be observed here that in both pūrvavat and śesavat inferences the vyaptı or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in

Elaborate with example

Image illustration

Book references

Tarkasangrah of Annambhatta <nowiki>https://archive.org/details/TarkasangrahaOfAnnambhattaVNJha</nowiki>

@@ Line 60: / Line 60: @@
 [[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.
-Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in
+Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)|alt=]]
 ===Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवलव्यतिरेकी, अन्वयव्यतिरेकी)===
-Inferences have been categorized into three types based on the procedures used to establish vyapti or a universal relation between the hetu (middle term) and sadhya (major term): Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki, and Anvaya-vyatireki.  An inference is called kevalanvayi when vyapti between hetu and sadhya is established through only anvaya (presence) and there is no possible instance of Vyatireka (negative). For example,
+To understand this inference one has to have knowledge about Vyapti. This inference have been categorized into three types based on the procedures used to establish vyapti or a universal relation between the hetu (middle term) and sadhya (major term): Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki, and Anvaya-vyatireki.  An inference is called kevalanvayi when vyapti between hetu and sadhya is established through only anvaya (presence) and there is no possible instance of Vyatireka (negative). For example,
 All knowable objects are nameable, The bike is a knowable object, therefore the bike is nameable. Here,
@@ Line 89: / Line 92: @@
 Vyapti: What is not different from the other elements has no smell
-as the name itself suggests Anvaya vyatireki is that ground which possess both anvaya and vyatireka पर्वतो वन्हिमान धूमात्
+as the name itself suggests Anvaya vyatireki is that ground which possess both anvaya and vyatireka, wherever there is smoke there is fire

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ==Introduction ॥ परिचयः==
 Nyayashastra explores the practical methods for achieving authentic knowledge of metaphysical truths and the principles of knowing. It is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects where tarkashastra defines Knowledge as of two types: Smriti (Remembrance) and Anubhava (Experience).
-==Smriti and Anubhava ॥ स्मृतिअनुभवश्च==
+== Smriti and Anubhava ॥ स्मृतिअनुभवश्च==
 [[File:Buddhi .png|thumb|343x343px|Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created Using Canva)]]
 Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: Yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathartha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.
@@ Line 17: / Line 9: @@
 There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana and shabda.
-==Understanding the four pramanas ॥ चत्वारि प्रमाणानि ==
+==Understanding the four pramanas ॥ चत्वारि प्रमाणानि==
 '''Pratyksha pramana-''' In Tarkasangraha Pratyksha pramana is defined as
@@ Line 55: / Line 47: @@
 Perception is limited to the present because perception is done through the sense. the knowledge of the thing which is beyond the reach of the senses is not obtained from perception. But
-==Types of inference ॥ अनुमानस्य प्रकाराः==
+== Types of inference ॥ अनुमानस्य प्रकाराः==
 [[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Monali V. Chandelkar (Image is created using canva)]]
 An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svartha and parartha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat, and samanyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Purvavat and sheshavat inferences are based on causal uniformity, while samanyatodrshta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyapti or the universal proposition involved in reference.
-=== Svartha and Parartha (स्वार्थपरार्थश्च) ===
+===Svartha and Parartha (स्वार्थपरार्थश्च)===
 [[File:Swarthanumana.png|thumb|250x250px|alt=|Svarthanumana]]
 An inference is called svartha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. An example of this is when a man first notices a mass of smoke on a hill and then recalls that smoke and fire have a universal relationship, leading him to conclude that there is fire there.
@@ Line 65: / Line 57: @@
 Whereas, an inference is considered parartha when it is intended to convince others of the validity of the conclusion. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also  present in the minor term. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parartha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.
-===Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट)===
+=== Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट)===
 [[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.
 Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in
-===Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवल व्यतिरेकी, अन्वय व्यतिरेकी)===
+===Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवलव्यतिरेकी, अन्वयव्यतिरेकी)===
 Inferences have been categorized into three types based on the procedures used to establish vyapti or a universal relation between the hetu (middle term) and sadhya (major term): Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki, and Anvaya-vyatireki.  An inference is called kevalanvayi when vyapti between hetu and sadhya is established through only anvaya (presence) and there is no possible instance of Vyatireka (negative). For example,
@@ Line 85: / Line 77: @@
 With accordance to this universal affirmative proposition We can't have a real universal where statement like "No unnameable object is knowable" is possible, since we can't point to or name anything that is unnameable.
-In Kevala vyatireki the understanding of vyapti is attained solely through the way of agreement in vyatireka. For Instance, when one refers 'earth is different from non earth' (other elements) because it has smell.
+In Kevala vyatireki the understanding of vyapti is attained solely through the way of agreement in vyatireka. For Instance, when one refers 'earth is different from non earth' (other elements) because it has smell. Whatever is not different from non-earth does not possess smell e.g. water. the earth is not like that and therefore, it is not different from non-earth. Here there is no example to demonstrate 'whatever possess smell is different from non earth.' Because the entire earth is the paksha.
 What is not different from the other elements has no smell, the earth has smell, therefore the earth is different from the other elements.
@@ Line 99: / Line 88: @@
 Vyapti: What is not different from the other elements has no smell

@@ Line 60: / Line 60: @@
 === Svartha and Parartha (स्वार्थपरार्थश्च) ===
 An inference is called svartha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. An example of this is when a man first notices a mass of smoke on a hill and then recalls that smoke and fire have a universal relationship, leading him to conclude that there is fire there.
-[[File:Swarthanumana.png|thumb|250x250px|alt=|Svarthanumana]]
 Whereas, an inference is considered parartha when it is intended to convince others of the validity of the conclusion. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also  present in the minor term. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parartha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.
-=== Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट) ===
+===Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट)===
 [[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.
-Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]
+Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in

@@ Line 33: / Line 33: @@
 ==Anumana and its components ॥ अनुमानं तस्य घटकाश्च==
 All systems of Indian Philosophy agree in holding that anumana is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of Vyapti or a universal relation between two things.
 '''Classical example of anumana''': There is fire on the mountain because there is smoke; where there is smoke, there is fire.

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
 ==Smriti and Anubhava ॥ स्मृतिअनुभवश्च==
-[[File:Buddhi .png|thumb|343x343px]]
+[[File:Buddhi .png|thumb|343x343px|Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created Using Canva)]]
 Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: Yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathartha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.
-There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyakṣa, anumana, upamana and shabda.
+There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana and shabda.
 ==Understanding the four pramanas ॥ चत्वारि प्रमाणानि ==
-'''Pratyksha pramana-''' In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.
+'''Pratyksha pramana-''' In Tarkasangraha Pratyksha pramana is defined as
 '''Anumana pramana-''' Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.
-'''Upamana pramana -''' The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ). For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.
+'''Upamana pramana -''' The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation. For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.
-'''Shabda pramana-''' Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. (āptavākyam śabdaḥ)
+'''Shabda pramana-''' Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. आप्तवाक्यम्   शब्दः । āptavākyam śabdaḥ
@@ Line 49: / Line 53: @@
 ==Types of inference ॥ अनुमानस्य प्रकाराः==
-[[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Image is created using canva]]
+[[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Monali V. Chandelkar (Image is created using canva)]]
 An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svartha and parartha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat, and samanyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Purvavat and sheshavat inferences are based on causal uniformity, while samanyatodrshta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyapti or the universal proposition involved in reference.
@@ Line 62: / Line 66: @@
 [[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.
-Image Courtesy:- Image created using Chatgpt]]
+Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]
-Kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवल व्यतिरेकी, अन्वय व्यतिरेकी)

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 Knowledge and its two types
@@ Line 12: / Line 11: @@
 Nyayashastra explores the practical methods for achieving authentic knowledge of metaphysical truths and the principles of knowing. It is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects where tarkashastra defines Knowledge as of two types: Smriti (Remembrance) and Anubhava (Experience).
-== '''Smriti and Anubhava''' ==
+==Smriti and Anubhava==
 Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: Yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathartha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.
 There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyakṣa, anumana, upamana and shabda.
-== '''Understanding the four pramanas:''' ==
+==Understanding the four pramanas:==
-Pratyksha pramana- In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.
+'''Pratyksha pramana-''' In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.
-Anumana pramana- Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.
+'''Anumana pramana-''' Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.
-Upamana pramana - The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ). For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.
+'''Upamana pramana -''' The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ). For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.
-Shabda pramana- Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. (āptavākyam śabdaḥ)
+'''Shabda pramana-''' Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. (āptavākyam śabdaḥ)
-== '''Anumana and its components:''' ==
+'''Paksha'''- Paksha is the subject where we establish something. Paksha is the component of the inference in relation to which the inference is made. For example, the mountain in the above example is the paksha because there has been anumana regarding the mountain. Paksha is to be perceived but not inferred.
-Classical example of anumana: There is fire on the mountain because there is smoke; where there is smoke, there is fire.
+'''Sadhya-''' Sadhya is the object of inference; it is not perceived. Whatever is proved in relation to the paksha is called the sadhya. Fire is sadhya because the existence of fire in the mountain has been proved.
-Components of inference: Paksha (minor term), sadhya (major term), and hetu (middle term). The hetu makes a link between sadhya and paksha. Here, Paksha is the subject where we establish something. Paksha is the component of the inference in relation to which the inference is made. For example, the mountain in the above example is the paksha because there has been anumana regarding the mountain. Paksha is to be perceived but not inferred. Sadhya is the object of inference; it is not perceived. Whatever is proved in relation to the paksha is called the sadhya. Fire is sadhya because the existence of fire in the mountain has been proved. By which it is said to be the sadhya in the paksha, it is called the hetu. In the above example, smoke is hetu because, seeing the smoke, it is inferred that there is a fire on the mountain.
+'''Hetu-''' By which it is said to be the sadhya in the paksha, it is called the hetu. In the above example, smoke is hetu because, seeing the smoke, it is inferred that there is a fire on the mountain.
-Vyapti- Every inference is logically dependent on the knowledge of vyapti. It implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyapya) and the other is pervades (vyapaka). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrary,  a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other.
+'''Vyapti-''' Every inference is logically dependent on the knowledge of vyapti. It implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyapya) and the other is pervades (vyapaka). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrary,  a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other.
-Udaharana- Drishtant is a well-known instructive example that uses analogies to clarify an idea. It is frequently employed outside of formal inference, such as in disputes, scripture, or instruction. Its objective is to clarify an idea or help the audience understand something abstract by using something concrete or familiar.
+'''Udaharana-''' Drishtant is a well-known instructive example that uses analogies to clarify an idea. It is frequently employed outside of formal inference, such as in disputes, scripture, or instruction. Its objective is to clarify an idea or help the audience understand something abstract by using something concrete or familiar.
 Difference between anumana and pratyaksha
@@ Line 43: / Line 47: @@
 Perception is limited to the present because perception is done through the sense. the knowledge of the thing which is beyond the reach of the senses is not obtained from perception. But
-==  Types of inference:- ==
+==Types of inference:-==
-An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svartha and parartha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat, and samanyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Purvavat and sheshavat inferences are based on causal uniformity, while samanyatodrsta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyapti or the universal proposition involved in reference.
+[[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Image is created using canva]]
 An inference is called svartha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. An example of this is when a man first notices a mass of smoke on a hill and then recalls that smoke and fire have a universal relationship, leading him to conclude that there is fire there.
+[[File:Swarthanumana.png|thumb|250x250px|alt=|Svarthanumana]]
 Whereas, an inference is considered parartha when it is intended to convince others of the validity of the conclusion. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also  present in the minor term. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parartha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.
-In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current It will be observed here that in both pūrvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyaptı or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in
+=== Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta ===
+In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in
-Elaborate with example
 Image illustration